By Alex | AuxBeacon News Contributor
[Editor’s Note: We received this from one of our contributors. Thank you for your contribution.]
Despite the Civil Air Patrol having serious failures in aircraft safety, fund management, missing federal property, National Commander defiance, etc, the CAP did little to nothing to correct anything. There was no action, accountability or punishment taken by the Department of Defense IG, the U.S. Air Force and Congress.
The overall objective of the audit was to evaluate the administration and management of the CAP program, as directed by the Conference Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
CAP corporate headquarters did not have management controls for assets assigned to the volunteer force. The condition occurred because the Executive Director did not have authority over safety issues. As a result, safety issues, including aircraft maintenance and pilot certifications, were not adequately addressed. Eighty-four of the 86 aircraft had problems related to aircraft inspection and maintenance requirements. Of the 595 pilot records reviewed, 317 were deficient. Without authority over safety issues, assets (both equipment and personnel) could be subjected to undue risks and the Executive Director would not be able to properly exercise accountability and control of the assets.
The work covered September 1999 through May 2000 and resulted in visits to 11 wings (Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Oregon) and 64 flying units. Our review included the CAP safety program, pilot certifications, aircraft maintenance, and accidents and incidents reported from FY 1997 through the third quarter, FY 2000.
The CAP corporate headquarters did not have management controls over assets assigned to the volunteer force. Nearly all of the 86 aircraft maintenance records reviewed and 317 of the 595 pilot records reviewed had deficiencies. As a result, the safety of flight operations could be compromised (finding A).
CAP did not effectively administer the aircraft replacement program. As a result, CAP could not ensure effective and efficient accountability, distribution, or replacement of aircraft. Also, the use of the CAP Aircraft Modernization Program account for repair and replacement of aircraft had an appearance of impropriety (finding B).
CAP did not have supporting documentation to validate the 115,000 and 109,000 flying hours reported for FY 1998 and FY 1999, respectively. As a result, claims for reimbursement for counterdrug, search and rescue, liaison proficiency flying and other missions could be claimed or reimbursed more than once (finding C).
CAP did not have current accounting policies and procedures, did not process purchase requests properly, and had an internal audit staff that performed duties and functions that conflicted with internal auditing standards. In addition, the internal auditor had only performed two audits of the CAP Headquarters financial operations in 3 years. As a result, CAP may not be in compliance with the Office of Management and Budget Circulars and DoD Grant and Agreement Regulations (finding D).
None of the 66 flying units we visited was meeting the safety meeting requirements of CAP Regulation 62-1(E).
Seven wings and 36 flying squadrons did not perform the safety surveys required by CAP Regulation 62-1(E).
CAP was not adequately managing the CAP aircraft maintenance program because Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and CAP regulations were not complied with fully. Eighty-four of the 86 aircraft had problems related to aircraft inspection and maintenance requirements. As a result, CAP aircraft airworthiness could be jeopardized.
See Report Below for More Findings: